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Abstract
We propose a model for evolutionary game dynamics with three strategies A, B
and C in the framework of Moran process in finite populations. The model can be
described as a stochastic process which can be numerically computed from a system
of linear equations. Furthermore, to capture the feature of the evolutionary process,
we define two essential variables, the global and the local fixation probability. If the
global fixation probability of strategy A exceeds the neutral fixation probability,
the selection favors A replacing B or C no matter what the initial ratio of B to
C is. Similarly, if the local fixation probability of A exceeds the neutral one, the
selection favors A replacing B or C only in some appropriate initial ratios of B to
C. Besides, using our model, the famous game with AllC, AllD and TFT is analyzed.
Meanwhile, we find that a single individual TFT could invade the entire population
under proper conditions.
Key words: evolutionary game theory, three strategies, finite populations, global
fixation probability, local fixation probability
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1 Introduction
Since the theory of games was first explicitly applied in evolutionary biology
by Lewontin [1], it has undergone extensive development. Evolutionary game
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theory as a mathematical framework to depict the population dynamics under
natural selection has attracted much attention for a long time. It is a way of
thinking about particular phenotypes depending on their frequencies in the
population [2]. Much more important results in terms of the corresponding
replicator dynamics [3,4], in which the size of the well-mixed population is in-
finite, promote the development of the evolutionary game theory. Replicator
dynamics, which is due to Taylor and Jonker [5], is a system of determinis-
tic differential equations which could describe the evolutionary dynamics of
multi-species. Besides replicator dynamics, the Lotka-Volterra equations which
were devised by Lotka and Volterra, have received much attention. They are
the most common models for the dynamics of the population numbers [3,6],
whereas replicator dynamics is the most common model for the evolution of
the frequencies of strategies in a population. These two deterministic models
both fail to account for stochastic effects. Thus the theory of stochastic pro-
cesses plays an extraordinarily important role in depicting the evolutionary
dynamics.
In nature, however, populations are finite in size. Finite population effects
can be neglected in infinite populations, but affect the evolution in finite size.
In fact, with high probability, the state of the process for large size N re-
mains close to the results of corresponding deterministic replicator dynamics
for some large time T [7]. Recently, an explicit mean-field description in the
form of Fokker-Planck equation was derived for frequency-dependent selection
in finite populations [8,9,10]. It is an approach which could connect the situa-
tion of finite populations with that of infinite populations. The explicit rules
governing the interaction of a finite number of individuals with each other
are embodied in a master equation. And the finite size effects are captured in
the drift and diffusion terms of a Fokker-Planck equation where the diffusion
term vanishes with 1/N for increasing population sizes. This framework was
extended to an evolutionary game with an arbitrary number of strategies [11].
The stochastic evolutionary processes would be characterized by the stochas-
tic replicator-mutator equation x˙i = ai(~x) +
∑d−1
j=1 cij(~x)ξj(t), here xi means
the density of the ith individuals using one of the arbitrary d strategies. Note
that the difference between above equation and the replicator dynamics in
infinite populations is the uncorrelated Gaussian noises term
∑d−1
j=1 cij(~x)ξj(t).
Thus the finite size effects can be viewed as combinations of some uncorrelated
Gaussian noises.
Nowak introduced the frequency-dependent Moran process into evolutionary
game in finite populations [12,13,14]. The frequency-dependent Moran process
is a stochastic birth-death process. It follows two steps: selection, a player is
selected to reproduce with a probability proportional to its fitness, and the
offspring will use the same strategy as its parent; replacement, a randomly
selected individual is replaced by the offspring. Hence, the population size,
N , is strictly constant [15]. Suppose a population consists of individuals who
use either strategy A or B. Individual using strategy A receives payoff a or
b playing with A or B individual; individual using strategy B obtains payoff
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c or d playing with A or B individual. Viewing individuals using strategy A
as mutants, we get the probability x¯(i) that i mutants could invade and take
over the whole populations. The fitness of individuals using strategy A and B
is respectively given by:
fi = 1− w + w[a(i− 1) + b(N − i)]/(N − 1)
gi = 1− w + w[ci+ d(N − i− 1)]/(N − 1)
(1)
Here i = 1, 2, · · · , N − 1, w ∈ [0, 1] describes the contribution of the game to
the fitness. For neutral selection, it needs w = 0; for weak selection, it must
satisfy the condition w ≪ 1. Accordingly, the fixation probability x¯(i) is given
by [16]:
x¯(0) = 0, x¯(N) = 1
x¯(i) =
1 +
i−1∑
j=1
j∏
k=1
gk
fk
1 +
N−1∑
j=1
j∏
k=1
gk
fk
, i = 1, 2, · · · , N − 1
(2)
In the limit of weak selection, the 1/3 law can be obtained. If A and B are
strict Nash equilibria and the unstable equilibrium occurs at a frequency of
A which is less than 1/3, then selection favors replacement of B by A. More-
over, stochastic evolution of finite populations need not choose the strict Nash
equilibrium and can therefore favor cooperation over defection [17].
Obviously, the characteristic timescales also play a crucial role in the evolu-
tionary dynamics. Sometimes, although the mutant could invade the entire
population, it takes such a long time that the population typically consists
of coexisting strategies [18]. It can be shown that a single mutant following
strategy A fixates in the same average time as a single B individual does in
a given game, although the fixation probability for the two strategies are dif-
ferent [19]. Furthermore, if the population size is appropriate for the fixation
of the cooperative strategy, then this fixation will be fast [20]. Besides the
standard Moran process, Wright-Fisher model and pairwise comparison using
Fermi function are brought into the analysis of the evolutionary game in finite
populations [21,22]. Moreover, spatial structure effects can not be ignored in
the real world. Much results reveal that a proper spatial structure could en-
hance the fixation probability [23,24].
Most results state the situation with two strategies. But in reality, there may
be many strategies in a game. Furthermore, in coevolution of three strategies,
how and why a single A individual could invade a finite population of B and
C individuals, what kinds of strategists would be washed out by the natural
selection, and how cooperation could emerge in finite populations are unclear.
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Motivated by these, here we study the evolutionary game of finite populations
with three strategies. This paper is organized as follows. Using the stochas-
tic processes theory, we formulate the evolutionary game dynamics in finite
populations as a system of linear equations in Section 2. The variable of these
equations is fixation probability x(i, j), which represents the probability that
i individuals using strategy A could dominate a population in which j of them
follow strategy B and N−i−j follow strategy C. Two probabilities, the global
and the local fixation probability, act crucial roles in the evolutionary game
dynamics with three strategies. If the global fixation probability of a single A
individual exceeds the neutral fixation probability 1/N , the selection favors A
replacing B or C no matter what the initial ratio of B to C is. Similarly, if the
local fixation probability exceeds the neutral one 1/N , the selection favors A
replacing B or C only in some appropriate initial ratios of B to C. In Section
3, some numeric computations of evolutionary game with AllC, AllD and TFT
are adopted to investigate the emergence of cooperation in some specified sit-
uations. For weak selection and sufficiently large size N , we find a condition
in terms of the number of rounds n and the ratio r of cost to benefit, under
which the selection favors only one TFT replacing AllC or AllD individuals.
Furthermore, the condition under which a single TFT could invade the entire
population is also obtained. Finally, the results are summarized and discussed
in Section 4.
2 Model
Let us consider a well-mixed population of constant and finite N individuals
. Suppose the strategy set in our model is A, B and C. The payoff matrix of
the three strategies is
A B C
A a b p
B c d q
C m n l
The fitness of individuals using A, B and C is respectively as follows:
fi,j = 1− w + w[a(i− 1) + bj + p(N − i− j)]/(N − 1)
gi,j = 1− w + w[ci+ d(j − 1) + q(N − i− j)]/(N − 1)
hi,j = 1− w + w[mi+ nj + l(N − i− j − 1)]/(N − 1)
(3)
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Here i denotes the number of individuals using strategy A, j denotes the
number of those using strategy B, and there are N − i − j players using
strategy C. The balance between selection and drift can be described by a
frequency-dependent Moran process. At each time step, the number of A indi-
viduals increases by one corresponding to two situations. One is eliminating a
B individual whereas the number of C players keeps unchanged. The other is
eliminating a C individual whereas the number of B players keeps unchanged.
The transition probabilities can be formulated as:
P j,ji,i+1 =
ifi,j
ifi,j + jgi,j + (N − i− j)hi,j
N − i− j
N
P j,j−1i,i+1 =
ifi,j
ifi,j + jgi,j + (N − i− j)hi,j
i
N
P j,ji,i−1 =
(N − i− j)hi,j
ifi,j + jgi,j + (N − i− j)hi,j
i
N
P j,j+1i,i−1 =
jgi,j
ifi,j + jgi,j + (N − i− j)hi,j
i
N
P j,j+1i,i =
jgi,j
ifi,j + jgi,j + (N − i− j)hi,j
(N − i− j)
N
P j,j−1i,i =
(N − i− j)hi,j
ifi,j + jgi,j + (N − i− j)hi,j
j
N
P j,ji,i = 1− P
j,j+1
i,i − P
j,j−1
i,i − P
j,j+1
i,i−1 − P
j,j
i,i−1 − P
j,j−1
i,i+1 − P
j,j
i,i+1
(4)
Here P j,ji,i+1 is the transition probability from the state of i A, j B and N−i−j
C individuals to that of i + 1 A, j B and N − i − j − 1 C individuals. Let
x(i, j) denotes the fixation probability that i A individuals could invade the
population of j B and N− i− j C individuals. We have the recursive relation:
x(i, j) = x(i+ 1, j)P j,ji,i+1 + x(i+ 1, j − 1)P
j,j−1
i,i+1
+ x(i− 1, j)P j,ji,i−1 + x(i− 1, j + 1)P
j,j+1
i,i−1
+ x(i, j + 1)P j,j+1i,i + x(i, j − 1)P
j,j−1
i,i + x(i, j)P
j,j
i,i
(5)
Researchers reported that in a well-mixed environment, two of the initial three
kinds of strategists would go extinct after some finite time, while coexistence
of the populations was never observed [25]. In finite populations, no matter
how many kinds of individuals initially, only one type of strategists can survive
in the evolutionary game eventually. Hence, the fixation probabilities of the
game with two strategies can be viewed as special boundary conditions of our
model. There are three types of boundary conditions:
(1)obviously, x(0, j) = 0, j = 0, 1, · · · , N ;
(2)x(i, 0) = x˜(i), i = 0, 1, · · · , N , here x˜(i) is the fixation probability that i A
individuals could take over the population of N − i C and no B players;
(3)similarly, x(i, N − i) = x¯(i), i = 0, 1, · · · , N , here x¯(i) means the fixation
5
probability that i A individuals could invade the population of N − i B and
no C players.
Note that x¯(i) can be formulated as Eq. 2. Similarly, x˜(i) is written as
x˜(i) =
1 +
i−1∑
j=1
j∏
k=1
hk
f ′k
1 +
N−1∑
j=1
j∏
k=1
hk
f ′k
here i = 1, 2, · · · , N − 1, f ′i = 1 − w + w[a(i − 1) + p(N − i)]/(N − 1),
hi = 1−w + w[mi+ l(N − i− 1)]/(N − 1), and the corresponding boundary
conditions are x˜(0) = 0, x˜(N) = 1.
The relationship among the solutions of the system of equations can be de-
picted by Fig. 1. The point (i, j) marked by full black dot denotes the boundary
condition of the equations, while this marked by empty dot denotes the un-
known of the equations. Thus in what follows, the unknown element x(i, j) of
our interest is discussed.
Fig. 1. The point (i, j) marked by full black dot means the boundary condition of
the equations, while this marked by empty dot means the unknown of the equations
which could be formulated by the boundary conditions.
Eq. 5 can be transformed to Eq. 6 which is a system of linear equations in
(N − 1)(N − 2)/2 variables.
[i(N − i)fi,j + j(N − j)gi,j + (i+ j)(N − i− j)hi,j]x(i, j)
= i(N − i− j)hi,jx(i− 1, j) + ijgi,jx(i− 1, j + 1)
+ i(N − i− j)fi,jx(i+ 1, j) + ijfi,jx(i+ 1, j − 1)
+ j(N − i− j)gi,jx(i, j + 1) + j(N − i− j)hi,jx(i, j − 1)
(6)
Where i = 1, 2, · · · , N − 2, j = 1, 2, · · · , N − i − 1. Accordingly, Eq. 5 can
also be simplified to A~x = ~b, where ~x is a vector (x(1, 1), x(1, 2), · · · , x(1, N −
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2), x(2, 1), x(2, 2), · · · , x(2, N−3), · · · , x(i, 1), x(i, 2), · · · , x(i, N−i−1), · · · , x(N−
2, 1))T , A is the corresponding coefficient (N−1)(N−2)/2×(N−1)(N−2)/2
dimensional matrix,~b is the corresponding vector composed of these boundary
conditions. Matrix A can be written as follows:


AN−2,N−2 AN−2,N−3 0 0 · · · 0 0
AN−3,N−2 AN−3,N−3 AN−3,N−4 0 · · · 0 0
0 AN−4,N−3 AN−4,N−4 AN−4,N−5 · · · 0 0
0 0 AN−5,N−4 AN−5,N−5 AN−5,N−6 · · · 0
...
...
...
...
0 0 · · · 0 A2,3 A2,2 A2,1
0 0 · · · 0 0 A1,2 A1,1


(7)
Here AN−i,N−j states a (N − i)× (N − j) block of matrix A.
For fixed i, in the sub-vector (x(i, 1), x(i, 2), · · · , x(i, N − i− 1))T , there exist
a maximal probability xmax(i) and a minimal probability xmin(i). They both
play significant roles in the evolution process. Note that in evolutionary dy-
namics, we have xmax(1) ≤ xmax(2) ≤ · · · ≤ xmax(N−2), xmin(1) ≤ xmin(2) ≤
· · · ≤ xmin(N − 2). If a single A individual can be favored to replace B or C,
more than one A individuals are more likely to replace B or C. Thus we only
focus on the fixation probabilities x(1, j). For a neutral mutant, the fixation
probability is 1/N . When x(1, j) > 1/N , natural selection favors A replacing
B or C. We define xmin(i) as global fixation probability and xmax(i) as local
fixation probability of i A individuals. If xmin(1) > 1/N , natural selection
favors A replacing B or C no matter what the ratio of B to C is , that is
global. Similarly, if xmax(1) > 1/N , the selection favors A replacing B or C in
some proper ratios of B to C, not any ratios, that is local. Accordingly, there
may be three situations:
(1) if xmax(1) < 1/N , natural selection never favors A replacing B and C;
(2) if xmin(1) > 1/N , natural selection always favors A replacing B or C
whatever the ratio of B to C is. It is likely that A could invade the population;
(3) if xmin(1) < 1/N and xmax(1) > 1/N , natural selection favors A replacing
B or C in some proper ratios of B to C. Thus the fixation of A is possible
under some suitable conditions.
Let us compare the evolutionary game dynamics in infinite populations with
that in finite populations. The finite size effects bring stochastic factor to the
evolution. A individuals which are eliminated in infinite populations may be
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favored by natural selection replacing B or C individuals. In Fig. 2, the left col-
umn shows evolutionary game with a small frequency of A individuals initially
in infinite populations, and the right column shows that with a single A indi-
vidual at first in finite populations. The first row shows situations with payoff
matrix a = 2, b = 4, p = 4, c = 3, d = 5, q = 1, m = 3, n = 1, l = 5, the size
N = 50, w = 0.1. A individuals will disappear in infinite populations no matter
how many B and C individuals are initially. While in finite populations, the
selection won’t favor A replacing B or C. The second row shows the situations
with payoff matrix a = 5, b = 4, p = 4, c = 4, d = 3, q = 4, m = 4, n = 4, l = 3,
the size N = 50, w = 0.1. A individuals will always invade the population
of B and C individuals in infinite populations. And in finite populations,
natural selection will all the time favor A replacing B or C no matter what
the ratio of B to C is. The third row shows situations with payoff matrix
a = 5, b = 5, p = 1.6, c = 5, d = 5, q = 0, m = 3, n = 7, l = 2, N = 50, w = 0.1.
A individuals will disappear in infinite populations no matter how many B
and C individuals are initially. Furthermore, from plenty of computations, we
find that A individuals will monotonously decrease to zero in infinite situation.
Whereas sometimes A will tend to replace B or C in finite populations.
For the three payoff matrixes in Fig. 2, it is clear that the fixation probability
of A individual is not always monotonic function of the number of B indi-
viduals (see Fig. 3). Thus, the global and local fixation probability of A may
nontrivially occur at intermediate ratio of B to C, not always end points of
the ratio range of B to C.
3 AllC-AllD-TFT
Let us consider a very interesting and famous repeated game with three strate-
gies AllC (cooperate all the time), AllD (defect all the time) and TFT (tit-
for-tat). TFT is an adaptive cooperative strategy which is one of the most
successful strategies proved by experiments. Individuals using TFT cooperate
in the first round generally, and then do whatever the opponents did in the
previous round. The number of rounds n, by definition, can be 1, 2, · · · ,∞.
If the rounds are infinite, this game is out of our consideration. In one-round
repeated Prisoners’ Dilemma game, a cooperator can obtain a benefit of b or
0 if it meets a cooperator or defector, meanwhile, it must cost c whomever its
opponent is; a defector can obtain a benefit of b or 0 if it meets a cooperator
or defector, but costs nothing in the whole process. We bring the ratio of cost
to benefit, by definition, r (r = c/b∈[0,1]), into our game, the payoff matrix
8
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Fig. 2. The comparisons between different situations corresponding to infinite and
finite populations respectively. In the left column figures, the x−axis denotes the
percentage of B individuals initially, meanwhile, the y−axis denotes the percentage
of A individuals after 1000 steps. In the right column figures, the x−axis shows the
size of the population, and the y−axis shows the fixation probability of a single A.
Let NFP, LFP and GFP represent the neutral fixation probability 1/N , the local
and the global fixation probability respectively.
between cooperator and defector can be simplified as follows:
C D
C 1 0
D 1 + r r
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Fig. 3. The fixation probability of only one A individual as a function of the number
of B individuals. WhereN = 50, NFP is the neutral fixation probability, PMi means
the situation with payoff matrix i in Fig. 2, i = 1, 2, 3. The fixation probability
of only one A individual is not always monotonic function of the number of B
individuals. The global and local fixation probability may be not at the end points
of the curve.
Thus the payoff matrix of TFT, AllC and AllD with n rounds is
TFT AllC AllD
TFT n n (n− 1)r
AllC n n 0
AllD 1 + nr n(1 + r) nr
The pairwise comparison of the three strategies leads to the following conclu-
sions.
(1) AllC is dominated by AllD, which means it is best to play AllD against
both AllC and AllD;
(2) TFT is equal to AllC when TFT plays with AllC;
(3) If the average number of rounds exceeds a minimum value, n > 1/(1− r),
then TFT and AllD are bistable.
Suppose that a single individual using strategy TFT is brought in the popula-
tion in which some individuals adopt strategy AllC and the others use strategy
AllD originally. Provided that the number of rounds is finite and greater than
1/(1− r), the strategies TFT and AllD are both strict Nash equilibrium and
evolutionary stable strategies (ESS) [2]. If n = 1, TFT becomes strategy C
which is out of our discussion. Thus we need finite n≫ 2. For a fixed number
of individuals and a value of the rounds, we find that there is a barrier of r
which can determine whether or not the selection favors TFT replacing AllC
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or AllD. The barrier also has two types: one is rl, which represents the barrier
of local situation; the other is rg, which represents that of global situation.
If r < rl, the natural selection favors TFT replacing AllC or AllD locally,
whereas if r > rl, TFT tends to be washed out by selection. The results about
rg are similar. Under the condition of weak selection, for sufficiently large
population size N and large number of rounds n, the barrier ratio r as the
function of n is approximately followed by (n− 1)/(n+ θ), here θ is a param-
eter dependent with N . In Fig. 4, we can fit rl and rg as rl = (n− 1)/(n+ 2),
and rg = (n − 1)/(n + 2.6). In general, for w ≪ 1, sufficiently large N and
large n, from abundant numeric computations, we obtain rl = (n− 1)/(n+2)
and rg = (n− 1)/(n+ θg), here θg is also a parameter dependent with N and
θg > 2. Thereforce, rl > rg. In other words, the ratio r which could lead the
selection to favor TFT replacing AllC or AllD globally can also induce local
replacement, but not vice versa.
Deterministic replicator dynamics with three strategies in infinite populations
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Fig. 4. The global and local barrier ratios rg and rl as a function of the number of
rounds n. Here N = 50, w = 0.1. r′g represents the fitting curve of rg, r
′
l represents
the fitting curve of rl. We can fit rl and rg as rl =
n−1
n+2
, and rg =
n−1
n+2.6
.
admits two interior equilibria at frequency of TFT given by x∗ = r/(n−1)(1−
r) and x∗∗ = nr/(n − 1). For local situation, substitude r < (n − 1)/(n + 2)
into x∗ and x∗∗, we get x∗ < 1/3 and x∗∗ < n/(n + 2); for global situation,
substitude r < (n − 1)/(n + θg) into x
∗ and x∗∗, we obtain x∗ < 1/(1 + θg)
and x∗∗ < n/(n+ θg). If the frequency of TFT at the equilibrium is x
∗ < 1/3
or x∗∗ < n/(n+2) in infinite populations, it will be favored replacing AllC or
AllD locally in finite situation; if the frequency of TFT at the equilibrium of
infinite situation is x∗ < 1/(1+ θg) or x
∗∗ < n/(n+ θg), it will tend to replace
AllC or AllD globally by TFT in finite populations.
The 1/3 law proposed by Nowak in [12] is still valid in our case, that is, the
selection favors TFT replacing AllC or AllD in finite populations, if its fre-
quency at the equilibrium is x∗ < 1/3 in infinite populations. However, when
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there are three strategies TFT, AllC and AllD, in which TFT’s frequency
at one equilibrium is x∗, the corresponding frequency of AllC is zero. Thus
in this situation, our results to some extent validate the conjecture in which
AllC is eliminated by natural selection so quickly that the effect of AllC can
be neglected in finite populations. And then the evolutionary game dynamics
with the two left strategies TFT and AllD, is equivalent to the situation of
the situation with these two strategies initially. Nevertheless not any size of
AllC individuals could be wiped out quickly, their effects can not be ignored
in the dynamics. Hence x∗ < 1/3 can only determine the replacement locally
(in some certain circumstances). As for global fixation situation (the fixation
is certain for any ratio of AllC to AllD), we have x∗ < 1/(1 + θg) < 1/3 for
θg > 2. The conditions that natural selection favors global replacement of AllC
or AllD by TFT are more intensified than those of local situation.
Let us discuss the other equilibrium. The n/(n+ θ) is a monotony increasing
function of n. This n/(n+ θ) approaches one for increasing n. That is to say,
when the number of rounds increases, the condition x∗∗ < n/(n + θ) can be
satisfied with higher probability, and TFT may have more opportunities to
replace AllC or AllD locally and globally. In the standard evolutionary model
of the finitely repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma, TFT can not invade AllD. But
interestingly, we find that for intermediate n, if x∗∗ < n/(n+ θ), nature selec-
tion favors TFT replacing AllC or AllD as the fixation probability of a single
TFT (ρTFT ) is larger than that of a single AllC (ρAllC) or AllD (ρAllD). Ac-
tually, in this case, ρTFT > 1/N > max(ρAllD, ρAllC). Therefore, a single TFT
is likely to invade the entire population consisting of AllC and AllD finally.
In this case, cooperation tends to emerge in the evolution process. And yet,
for large limit n, the situation is out of our consideration due to its extraor-
dinary intricacy. However, as n increasing to infinite, the probability that the
selection favors TFT taking over the whole population also approaches one.
Accordingly, the fixation of cooperation is enhanced in finite populations. It is
because that when TFT meets AllD, its loss in the first round can be diluted
by many rounds games. In this case, the total fitness of TFT is almost the
same as that of AllD and they are a pair of nip and tuck opponents. But TFT
receives more payoff than AllD when they both play with TFT. To sum up,
TFT is superior to AllD for limit large rounds because of its adaption. As
a result of this property of TFT, natural selection mostly prefers to choose
TFT to reproduce offspring, and then TFT is most likely to dominate the
population at last. Therefore, cooperation has more opportunities to win in
finite populations contrasting against infinite situation.
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4 Conclusion
We have proposed a model of evolutionary game dynamics with three strate-
gies in finite populations. It can be characterized by a frequency-dependent
Moran process which could be stated by a system of linear equations. By the
comparative study of evolution in finite and infinite populations, we shew that
a single A individual which can not invade infinite populations may have an
opportunity to replace B or C in finite situation. In other words, a single
A individual could be eliminated by selection with smaller probability in fi-
nite populations than situation in infinite populations. In addition, a famous
game with AllC, AllD, and TFT is adopted to illuminate our results by nu-
meric computations. Furthermore, under the condition of weak selection, for
sufficiently large population size N and appropriate number of rounds n, a
single TFT could invade the population composed of AllC and AllD with high
probability almost one. In this situation, the emergence of cooperation is at-
tributed to the finite population size effects. Our results may help understand
the coevolution of multi-species and diversity of natural world.
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